…and every election for another half-century

New Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan is the sixth PM in five years. Can he beat the bureaucrats? (Itsuo Inouye, AP)

There are striking similarities between two of the most successful political parties in modern history. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been frequently compared to Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, both of which have governed without interruption for close to or more than half a century. In their best years, both played shrewd politics and proposed sensible policies. Both are fiscal conservatives with largely enlightened and successful economic management.

This comparison has been so convincing among political analysts, that even the half-century lifespan of the LDP is used to predict when the PAP eventually loses dominance as Singapore’s ruling party. This is a convenient association, but a misleading one. The PAP will win every national election for possibly another half century, even after close to five decades of uninterrupted rule. There are three reasons why the PAP is not, and will not be, a LDP.

The word “PAP” really refers to a unified body of party cadres and civil servants.

The first is that the PAP is really a government, and not an administration. It enjoys remarkable co-operation with the civil service: whether in civil servants parachuting into party ranks, in making and enforcing policy to advance national goals that both agree upon, or in the government appointing members overseeing promotion within the service. This is why “PAP” really refers to a unified body of party cadres and civil servants, and why some Singaporeans have publicly derided civil service scholars joining the Opposition as disloyal not just to the party – but to Singapore.

Japan’s civil service, on the other hand, has no such affinity with the ruling party. The elite bureaucrats wield such immense power that LDP politicians often complained that legislation was simply ignored by ministries. The new ruling Democratic Party, upon taking power, even declared a new era of “leadership by politics”. By being more than a party (like the LDP), but an entire government, the PAP’s rule will be extremely difficult to break. The working relationship fostered between the party and civil service for close to half a century has created “institutional thickness” for the PAP, while leaving the Opposition stunted in its inexperience.

Early  ’corrective action’ is the PAP’s greatest secret for prevailing without interruption, and for so long, in a fledgling democracy.

The second reason for the PAP’s continued dominance is a lack of political and non-political Opposition. It was not always without a strong opposition, but the formative PAP, led by MM Lee, was outstandingly deft at political manoeuvring. Once it assumed power in Singapore’s first General Election, it immediately went about restricting not the liberties or powers of opposition elements, but the conditions and circumstances in which these could be exercised. Compliance was enforced at first, but as radical elements were systematically excluded from mainstream politics, so popular support for them diminished.

This early ‘corrective action’ is the PAP’s greatest secret for prevailing without interruption, and for so long, in a new democracy. Today the unions remain snug with the status quo and naturally toe the PAP’s line. It worked intimately with the government to develop comprehensive reskilling schemes during the last recession, and reminded its own members that in a recession, unemployment was – and had always been – a problem with their skills and not the government’s.

The LDP was never quite so deft, or post-war opposition elements were simply not so malleable to the ruling party. Today, Japan’s unions are powerful, independent and non-aligned. Loyalty to either the LDP or DPJ must be traded for tangible gains that are not always in line with the ruling party’s national strategies.

The third, and possibly most direct, reason to expect future dominance by the PAP is Singapore’s Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system. With its introduction, the super-majority the PAP enjoyed allowed it to amend the Constitution to become a ‘hyper-majority’: not in terms of seats in Parliament, but of the permanent occupation of these seats.

Smiling amidst the grit: Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo is facing a tough contest. (Shirley Ho, Channel NewsAsia)

Case in point: it’s popular belief that Aljunied GRC looks to be the most contested battleground this GE 2011, with the PAP’s victory – and Foreign Minister George Yeo’s next term in Parliament – least certain. This has raised alarm bells, with MM Lee, PM Lee and citizens expressing concern about the potential loss of the likes of Mr Yeo and its effect on foreign policy. And the Worker’s Party seems to be riding on a wave of bottled popular support, waiting to explode.

So long as the GRC system exists, all the PAP needs to do to continue dominating Parliament is to allocate one bigwig per GRC it contests.

But that’s why the GRC, the PAP’s brainchild, is such electoral genius. Although it mandates a minimum proportion of minority representation, it has done nothing to raise this representation in Parliament – since its implementation, its percentage of minorities has fallen. Yet so long as it exists – and it will exist for a very long time with a hyper-majority – all the PAP needs to do to continue dominating Parliament is to allocate one bigwig per GRC it contests. If Singapore were a land too precious to fail, then key party members in the Cabinet would be too important to lose. Aljunied voters will never risk losing a George Yeo for a Low Thia Kiang, because they have to vote in what they deem to be in the nation’s interest. Singaporeans are a largely practical and risk-averse lot.

Yet Japanese are also famously chaste on risk-taking. What’s different is their bicameral legislature that results in a parallel voting system. Citizens can vote on both party and candidate lines. As a result even a risk-averse electorate can produce regime change: here that’s rather less likely.

Mr George Yeo can sleep in peace tonight.

What will stop the PAP’s rule? Nothing, apparently, in the near horizon. A few wildcards might change the game irreversibly, though: a failure of the PAP’s renewal policy to produce genuinely electable talent, a mass citizen-led revolt born of economic hardship, or a decoupling of the party-civil service nexus due to leadership changes. But right now, PAP leadership can rest easy: GE 2011 will be like any other election before, and probably like any other election after. And tonight, Mr George Yeo can sleep in peace too. He will keep his Foreign Minister portfolio after all.